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Scoping Note on a Scottish 
Publicly Owned Energy 
Company 
Ragne Low, Principal KE Fellow 
Centre for Energy Policy, University of Strathclyde International Public Policy Institute 
Executive Summary 
This scoping note provides the Economy, Jobs and Fair Work Committee of the 
Scottish Parliament with evidence to consider in its review of proposals for establishing 
a Scottish Publicly Owned Energy Company (POEC). Conducted over a short period, 
the scoping note is based upon a rapid review of the literature on public and not-for-
SURILWHQHUJ\FRPSDQLHVWKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶V6WUDWHJLF2XWOLQH&DVHGRFXPHQW 
discussion with a number of interested stakeholders and the evidence and views 
presented to the EJFW Committee during its inquiry on the draft Scottish Energy 
Strategy in 2017. 
In its consultation on the draft Scottish Energy Strategy (January-May 2017), the 
Scottish Government sought views on the potential role and remit of a publicly owned 
energy company to help the growth of local and community projects. In October 2017, 
the First Minister made a commitment to establish a not-for-profit, publicly owned 
energy company to supply energy to consumers at as close to cost price as possible. 
A Strategic Outline Case was published by the Scottish Government in March 2018 
setting out a series of operating models for delivering on the core objective of providing 
competitively priced energy and helping to alleviate fuel poverty. The options set out 
in Strategic Outline Case centre around the establishment of an energy supply 
company (a retailer of gas and electricity to customers). This scoping note reviews the 
evidence on establishing a Scottish publicly owned energy supply company as well as 
wider evidence on what the purpose and model of a POEC could be. 
A number of key points emerge. GB electricity (and to a lesser extent gas) supply is a 
low margin market, a point recognised in the Strategic Outline Case and reinforced by 
many sector stakeholders. The number of smaller suppliers in that market has grown 
rapidly in the past five years, and an increasing number of these are offering fixed rate 
or very low margin tariffs. The latest data suggest that the pre-tax margin on the 
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average dual fuel consumer bill is just under 5%. Importantly, this is almost all 
delivered by the gas component of bills. Average electricity pre-tax margins were 
below zero for 2016. In the current market, successful suppliers are those that can 
procure energy at lowest prices, have the most efficient billing and customer relations 
systems, and are best at hedging risk. This is the market into which a Scottish 
Government-owned supply company would be entering. 
Taking a wider view of the purpose a POEC might ultimately fulfil, the review 
conducted here suggests four overarching objectives a Scottish POEC could have:  
x Creating new energy infrastructure platforms 
x Accelerating wider energy system transformation 
x Increasing engagement and participation in the energy system 
x Reducing costs to consumers 
This review concludes that a Scottish publicly owned energy company can deliver on 
a number of these objectives. It also suggests that it is possible to integrate these 
wider objectives into planning for the POEC, even if the focus for the POEC is initially 
as an energy supply company. Further, it suggests that it is essential to consider these 
wider objectives in the context of how the POEC will interact with existing energy policy 
initiatives.  
The EJFW Committee may wish to support further public debate on both the purpose 
of the POEC and how it will work alongside existing policy, by considering the following 
questions: 
How might a Scottish energy supply company work best to support fuel poverty 
reduction?   
How can the POEC be best designed to maximise alignment with wider Scottish 
energy policy objectives, and to remove all potential tensions with other policy 
objectives? 
Should a new Scottish POEC be more than solely a licensed energy supply company? 
How might the POEC be designed to make space for objectives and functions beyond 
the retail of gas and electricity? What benefits might this have?  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 The Scottish Parliament Economy, Jobs and Fair Work Committee (EJFW) 
commissioned the Centre for Energy Policy at the University of Strathclyde to produce 
a scoping note setting out the potential options for a Scottish Publicly Owned Energy 
Company (POEC), taking into account WKHFRQWHQWRIWKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VRZQ
Strategic Outline Case (a report produced by Ernst & Young LLP (EY) for Scottish 
Ministers, dated 29 March)DQGWKH(-):&RPPLWWHH¶VUHVSRQVHWRWKHGUDIW6FRWWLVK
Energy Strategy (letter to Mr. Wheelhouse dated 30 June 2017).  
1.2 The purpose of the scoping note is to inform an EJFW Committee call for 
evidence on the POEC.  
2. Context 
Background  
2.1 The commitment to explore setting up a Scottish publicly owned energy 
company first appeared in the 6FRWWLVK1DWLRQDO3DUW\¶V(OHFWLRQ0DQLIHVWR, which 
FRQWDLQHG D FRPPLWPHQW WR ³explore the potential to create a government owned 
energy company to help the growth of local and community energy projects. This will 
include empowering communities to use the income from energy developments to 
support other communities develop their energy potential´ 613S.30). In its 
consultation on the draft Scottish Energy Strategy (which ran from January ± May 
2017) the Scottish Government included a question on the potential role and remit of 
³D*RYHUQPHQW2ZQHG(QHUJ\&RPSDQ\WRKHOSWKHJURZWKRIORFDODQGFRPPXQLW\
SURMHFWV´ 
2.2 Following its inquiry on the draft Scottish Energy Strategy, the EJFW 
&RPPLWWHHUHFRPPHQGHGLQUHODWLRQWRWKHSURSRVDOIRUD32(&WKDW³Ln the interests 
of ensuring continuity of delivery for the strategy a long term framework be put in place; 
one which could include the establishment of an independent body´ (EJFW Committee 
2017, para 70). The Committee took a broad view of the role a new public entity might 
KDYHQRWLQJWKH³complexity of energy policy and the case for a national agency to 
oversee it´and referred to the UK Committee on Climate Change, the Danish Energy 
Agency, and the model of Transport Scotland for large infrastructure projects. 
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2.3 In October 2017, the First Minister made a commitment to set up a publicly-
owned, not-for-profit energy company by the end of the current Parliament (March 
2021)VWDWLQJWKDW³Hnergy would be bought wholesale or generated here in Scotland 
± renewable, of course ± and sold to customers as close to cost price as possible. It 
would give people ± particularly those on low incomes ± more choice and the option 
of a supplier whose only job is to secure WKHORZHVWSULFHIRUFRQVXPHUV´)LUVW0LQLVWHU
2017).   
2.4 Based on Scottish Government statements, the key rationale for establishing 
the company is the need to address fuel poverty, with the provision of greater choice 
for (Scottish) consumers, contributing to economic development, and helping to deliver 
broader Government energy ambitions ± including the promotion of renewable 
generation and maximising benefits for local communities ± also stated as objectives1.  
2.5 Based upon this rationale, the Scottish Government commissioned EY to 
generate a Strategic Outline Case (SOC) for the POEC. The SOC sets out a series of 
delivery options and operating models for delivering on the core objective WR³SURYLGH
competitively priced HQHUJ\ DQG KHOS DOOHYLDWH IXHO SRYHUW\´, acknowledging that 
options and appraisal criteria may need to change if the fundamental objectives of the 
POEC are refined or expanded (EY 2018, p.2). 
2.6 The Scottish Government is currently considering the SOC and is committed to 
public consultation as part of the process of further developing the case for the POEC 
(Scottish Government 2018). Following HM Treasury Green Book guidance, the SOC 
should be followed by an Outline Business Case that will explore in detail the shortlist 
of options generated in the SOC. This scoping note provides the EJFW Committee 
with a starting point to engage with the consultation processes around the further 
development of the case for a Scottish POEC.  
2.7 Given that WKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VVWDWHGUDWLRQDOHIRUHVWDEOLVKLQJD32(&
is to supply competitively priced energy to help address fuel poverty, this scoping note 
provides a brief outline of the drivers of, and policy context around, fuel poverty in 
Scotland. 
                                            
1
 See http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Business-Industry/Energy/POEC  and 
http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0052/00529523.pdf  
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Fuel poverty in Scotland 
2.8 A household is defined as being in fuel poverty if it needs to spend more than 
10% of household income to maintain an adequate heating regime2. Extreme fuel 
poverty is defined as needing to spend more than 20%. (England adopted a new 
definition in 2013: the µORZLQFRPHKLJKFRVWV¶GHILQLWLRQ.)  
2.9 The Scottish Government is about to introduce draft legislation for a new 
definition for Scotland. In 2016, the Scottish Fuel Poverty Strategic Working Group 
published its report µA Scotland Without Fuel Poverty is a Fairer Scotland¶6)36:*
2016). That report recommended a review of the definition of fuel poverty in Scotland, 
which was taken up by an independent panel of experts that published its own review 
of the evidence in November 2017. In that review, the panel states: ³$PDMRUGUDZEDFN
of the Boardman-based [10% of income needed to maintain a certain heating regime] 
definition is that households which have quite high incomes can be classified as fuel 
poor ± in Scotland especially, this group represents more than half of all those in fuel 
SRYHUW\ PDNLQJ WKLV D YHU\ VXEVWDQWLYH SUREOHP´ (Scottish Fuel Poverty Definition 
Review Panel 2017, p.12) 
2.10 7KH5HYLHZ3DQHO¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQZDVIRUDGHILQLWLRQDVIROORZV 
³+RXVHKROGVLQ6FRWODQGDUHLQIXHOSRYHUW\LI 
x  they need to spend more than 10% of their after housing costs income on heating 
and electricity in order to attain a healthy indoor environment that is commensurate 
with their vulnerability status;  
x and if these housing and fuel costs were deducted, they would have less than 90% 
RI6FRWODQG¶V0LQLPXP,QFRPH6WDQGDrd as their residual income from which to pay 
                                            
2
 The complete definition is: if more than 10% of income (including any social welfare 
payments) is needed to maintain a heating regime of 21C in the living room and 18C in other 
rooms for a period of 9 h in every 24 (or 16 in 24 over the weekend); with 2 h being in the 
morning and 7 h in the evening. For elderly and infirm households, this is increased to 23C in 
the living room and 18C in other rooms, to be achieved for 16 h in every 24. The current 
method uses modelled dwelling energy performance to calculate the cost of maintaining the 
standard heating regime, alongside income data based on face-to-face interviews with 
residents (data are for the income of the highest earner in the household). Due to the small 
sample sizes, the results are reported as a three-year rolling average. (Mould and Baker 
2017). 
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IRU DOO WKH RWKHU FRUH QHFHVVLWLHV FRPPHQVXUDWH ZLWK D GHFHQW VWDQGDUG RI OLYLQJ´
(Scottish Fuel Poverty Definition Review Panel 2017, p.15) 
2.11 Recent research shows low income rural households in Scotland are spending 
significantly more on energy than their urban equivalents, and rural households on 
lower incomes may be spending more on heating than those on higher incomes 
(Mould and Baker 2017). The Scottish Fuel Poverty Strategic Working Group (2016) 
reported fuel poverty rates of 50% in rural areas compared to 32% in urban areas, due 
to limited access to mains gas, larger detached dwellings and more exposure to wind 
and weather, with fuel poverty rates highest in electric-heated properties at up to 60%, 
and in energy inefficient properties at 73% in dwellings rated in the two poorest 
performing bands.  
2.12 As highlighted by the Competition and Markets Authority in its 2016 
investigation into the energy markets, energy suppliers have tended to rely upon 
customer inertia to bulk out their profits - with large numbers of their customers failing 
to switch off their standard variable tariff (which is usually higher than alternative tariffs) 
and/or failing to switch to an alternative supplier (CMA 2016). There is likely to be a 
strong link between fuel poverty and non-switching although we did not find direct 
evidence of this in the time available for this scoping review. 
 
Figure 1 ± Fuel poverty rates in Scotland 2003 ± 2016 (WHD refers to the Warm Home 
Discount) 
Source: http://www.gov.scot/About/Performance/scotPerforms/partnerstories/HARO/ 
Indicators/High-quality-sustainable  
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2.13 As shown in Figure 1, average fuel prices have fallen since 2014, the main 
driver for a reduction in fuel poverty levels over the same period (with improved energy 
efficiency accounting for about a third of the reduction in fuel poverty).  
2.14 Fuel poverty is a complex and multidimensional issue. Energy prices are clearly 
one important driver and a range of existing and emerging policies aim to offer 
protection to those most vulnerable to fuel poverty. 
Existing consumer protection measures 
2.15 A new µsafeguard tariff¶ ZDV LQWURGXFHG E\ 2IJHP (the electricity and gas 
markets regulator) in April 2017. The safeguard tariff applies to households that pay 
for gas or electricity in advance using a prepayment meter (and since February 2018, 
also to those households in receipt of the Warm Home Discount, which is a rebate on 
electricity bills). The safeguard tariff limits how much a supplier can charge per kWH. 
Ofgem sets the safeguard tariff level based upon an estimate of the true costs to 
supply energy: wholesale costs, network costs (these vary geographically), policy 
costs, operating costs, and costs specifically associated with prepayment meters.  The 
tariff is due to expire at the end of 2020 in parallel with expected completion of the 
smart meter rollout (Ofgem 2017).  
2.16 In February 2018, the UK Government introduced a Bill to Parliament for 
a temporary tariff cap for customers on Standard Variable (SVT) and default tariffs ± 
the default tariff cap (UK Government 2018).  
2.17 The proposed legislation: 
x creates a new duty for Ofgem to design and implement the default tariff cap 
x places a duty on Ofgem to implement the price cap as soon as practical.  
2.18 The current safeguard tariff covers around 5 million customers across GB. In 
December 2017, Ofgem consulted on extending existing protections to cover an 
additional 2 million vulnerable customers in winter 2018/19 if the default tariff cap is 
not introduced by then. Ofgem has proposed that eligibility for the extended safeguard 
tariff will be assessed based upon factors such as: receipt of income-related 
government benefits; receipt of disability benefits; and being on a default tariff. Whilst 
fuel poverty and consumer vulnerability are not the same thing, an extended 
vulnerable safeguard tariff (or default tariff cap) that is based upon evidence of low 
June 2018  Page 9 of 39 
income and disengagement with the energy market will help to address some aspects 
of fuel poverty (Ofgem 2017). Appendix I provides more detail on how the safeguard 
tariff is applied in Scotland. 
2.19 The Warm Home Discount itself is an obligation on energy suppliers to reduce 
electricity bills for those that meet the eligibility criteria by £140 per annum, paid as a 
one-off discount on electricity bills between September and March. The Scottish 
Government will consult on the new powers under the Scotland Act 2016 for the future 
design and implementation of the Energy Company Obligation and Warm Home 
Discount in Scotland. Other (non supplier) support is provided through two benefits: 
the Winter Fuel Payment scheme, essentially a pension top-up, and the Cold weather 
Payment, a payment made to eligible households (mostly poorer pensioners) in 
periods of very cold weather. 
2.20 There are thus efforts underway to address the energy price element of the 
causes of fuel poverty and these must be seen alongside wider policies to tackle 
income inequalities, and to improve the energy performance of homes and the 
efficiency of their appliances and heating systems. The links between plans for a 
POEC and the wider provisions of forthcoming draft legislation on fuel poverty need to 
be strong if the aim for the POEC is to help alleviate fuel poverty. And if in seeking to 
address fuel poverty the POEC is to be mainly or solely an energy supply company, 
its operational effectiveness will be very heavily determined by the context of the 
current GB energy markets. This is the topic of the next section of this scoping note. 
3. The GB Energy Markets 
3.1 In Britain, electricity and gas generated by producers of energy are traded and 
sold on to end consumers in liberalised wholesale and retail markets. The Scottish 
*RYHUQPHQW¶V VWDWHG SXUSRVH for the POEC is to ³Vell energy, whether bought 
ZKROHVDOH RU JHQHUDWHG LQ 6FRWODQG WR FXVWRPHUV DW DV ORZ D SULFH DV SRVVLEOH´ 
(Scottish Government 2018). This role as a retailer of energy to customers will 
necessarily involve the POEC becoming an energy supply company that participates 
in the GB energy markets for gas and electricity, which are described here. 
Gas 
3.2 The GB wholesale gas market is where natural gas is traded after it has arrived 
in Britain. Sources include offshore production, liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, 
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storage sites, pipelines from other countries (e.g. Norway) and interconnectors with 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Ireland. There is a single price for gas on the wholesale 
market (irrespective of where the gas comes from), called the National Balancing Point 
(NBP) price. Shippers bring gas into Britain or transport it within Britain. Suppliers 
provide gas to consumers. Availability and demand are matched on a daily basis by 
National Grid Gas.  
3.3 Energy suppliers purchase gas on the wholesale market and sell it on to their 
customers in the retail market. The gas retail market functions in the same way as the 
electricity retail market. The retail market is the market for the buying and selling of 
gas or electricity between consumers and gas or electricity suppliers (retailers). 
Consumers effectively engage a supply company to procure gas and electricity from 
shippers and generators on their behalf. Current trading arrangements allow 
consumers to choose their supplier and change supplier as often as they wish. Most 
suppliers offer both electricity and gas to their customers. 
Electricity 
3.4 :LWK WKH µIXQFWLRQDOXQEXQGOLQJ¶ of the electricity market under liberalisation, 
generators, network operators and retail suppliers operate as separate entities, 
contracting with one another to provide electricity to end-users. Suppliers and 
generators pay network owners for the right to transport energy on their networks. In 
the current market, successful suppliers are those that can procure energy at lowest 
prices, have most efficient billing and customer relations systems, and are best at 
hedging risk.  
3.5 Suppliers, generators and Non Physical Traders (for example, banks) trade 
electricity in the GB electricity wholesale market. Because electricity is currently not 
stored in significant volumes, generation and demand must be kept in balance at all 
times across the grid. Most electricity is traded bilaterally between generators and 
suppliers in advance to cover the minimum amount needed to match demand - often 
UHIHUUHGWRDVµEDVHORDG¶National Grid Electricity Transmission (NGET) is responsible 
for real-time matching of generation and demand, using a trading system called the 
Balancing Mechanism. All Parties in the wholesale market are required to lodge a 
GHSRVLWFDOOHGµ&UHGLW&RYHU¶to reduce the risk that the rest of the industry will have 
to pay for a defaulting 3DUW\¶VOLDELOLWLHV.  
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3.6 Figure 2 provides a simplified illustration of how the wholesale and retail 
electricity markets function, together with generation and distribution of power. 
Appendix II provides more detail on the functioning of the electricity market. 
 
Figure 2 ± Simplified GB electricity system ± power flows (blue) and commercial arrangements 
(orange) 
Sources: Ofgem website https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/electricity/wholesale-market/gb-electricity-
wholesale-market, and (OH[RQ¶Vµ7KHElectricity 7UDGLQJ$UUDQJHPHQWV$%HJLQQHU¶V*XLGH¶
November 2017 https://www.elexon.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/beginners_guide_v6.0.pdf  
The relationship between consumer bills and system costs 
3.7 Prices to consumers in the retail market comprise wholesale costs, network 
costs, policy costs, operating costs, VAT and pre-tax profits. The latest data from 
Ofgem, which are based on submissions from the six larger energy suppliers, suggest 
that the pre-tax margin on the average dual fuel consumer bill is just under 5%. 
Importantly, this is almost all delivered by the gas component of bills. Electricity pre-
tax margins were below zero in 2016 (i.e. electricity supply was loss making for the 
2016 period in which data were submitted), whereas for gas were almost 11% (Ofgem 
2018). The point that margins are tight is reinforced by evidence from a series of expert 
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workshops held in response to the Welsh $VVHPEO\¶V(QYLURQPHQWDQG6XVWDLQDELOLW\
Committee recommendation for the establishment of a Welsh energy company 
(Darnton 2017). 
3.8 Network costs vary regionally, reflecting actual costs of maintaining networks 
and of transporting energy across them from generators to consumers. This cost-
reflective charging is intended by Ofgem as a stimulus to overall system efficiency, 
incentivising generation near centres of demand. Broadly speaking, the idea is that 
the price a consumer pays should reflect how much it costs to transport energy to the 
region they live in.  
3.9 This is more an issue for electricity than for gas. In 2017, electricity consumers 
in the North of Scotland paid 7 - 9% more than the GB average (Scottish Government 
2018b). Overall, Ofgem analysis shows that regional variations in household bills are 
largely (but not exclusively) driven by regional variations in national and local network 
charges. This is more pronounced for electricity than for gas3. Regional differences in 
energy bills that are not driven by network charges are likely to have a range of causes, 
including variations in cost faced by suppliers in different regions. Market share and 
customer behaviour (for example, willingness to switch supplier) may also contribute 
to regional differences in supplier bills (Ofgem 2015). 
3.10 GB electricity (and to a lesser extent gas) supply is a low margin market, a point 
recognised in the Strategic Outline Case (EY 2018) and reinforced by many sector 
stakeholders. The number of smaller suppliers has grown rapidly in the past five years, 
and there are now 69 domestic suppliers (Ofgem 2018), an increasing number of 
which are offering fixed rate or very low margin tariffs (Cornwall Insight 2018). This is 
the market into which a Scottish Government-owned supply company would be 
entering. 
4. A publicly owned energy company 
4.1 As the EJFW Committee heard in its inquiry on the draft Scottish Energy 
Strategy, there is a range of strategic and delivery functions that a new public energy 
                                            
3
 For gas transmission, Ofgem analysis suggests that differences are so small that they are 
unlikely to be picked up in bills. Gas distribution cost differences are reflected in bills. Scottish 
consumers generally pay lower gas network costs than the average across GB regions 
(Ofgem 2015).    
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body could fulfil, each with value in terms of meeting the objectives of the Scottish 
*RYHUQPHQW¶VORQJWHUPHQHUJ\VWUDWHJ\ (EJFW Committee 2017). This section of the 
scoping note takes a step back from the specific potential objective of supplying 
competitively priced energy, to explore what wider potential objectives a POEC might 
have. 
Potential Purposes for a POEC 
4.2 Based upon a review of the evidence gathered by the EJFW Committee, the 
wider evidence presented in previous sections of this scoping note and engagement 
with stakeholders across the sector, at least four potential purposes emerge for a new 
public energy company: 
Creating new infrastructure platforms 
4.3 A public body would be well placed to support investment in new infrastructure 
which others, including private compaQLHV FRXOG WKHQ µSOXJ LQ WR¶ WR LQQRYDWH DQG
provide new energy services to consumers4. Examples of the type of infrastructure 
that could be supported are heat networks, energy storage infrastructure and electric 
vehicle charging infrastructure. The Scottish and UK Governments are already 
providing this type of support but a new body could act to better coordinate existing 
schemes and provide additional capacity and specialist expertise, as well as to 
increase levels of investment, accelerate the rate of roll-out and broaden the 
geographical spread of these new infrastructures. A new body could promote 
complementarity between energy system infrastructure investment and investment in 
energy efficiency under the National Infrastructure Priority announced by the Scottish 
Government (Scottish Government 2017). 
Accelerating wider energy system transformation 
4.4 A public body could provide more strategic and direct support for energy system 
innovation. It could provide advice and guidance on programme and project 
management for other public bodies and social enterprises, as well as coordinating 
                                            
4
 7KHWHUPµSXEOLFJRRG¶KDVFUHSWLQWRWKHSXEOLFGLVFRXUVHRQKRZJRYHUQPHQWFDQVXSSRUW
VXFKµSOXJDQGSOD\¶HQHUJ\ infrastructure. Strictly speaking, a genuine public good resource 
is something that is cost-free to access and for which the benefits of access are not exclusive. 
For energy infrastructure, there are costs associated with connecting-in any new user and a 
new user can only benefit from the resource by actively investing in accessing it. 
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access to funding and/or finance for those projects. It could provide a data service for 
the benefit of a range of energy system innovators, by collecting, holding and curating 
data and leveraging value from it for a range of potential users. Working with Ofgem, 
it could provide a platform for new business models to be trialled by others (e.g. local 
supply models) including commercial actors. 
Increasing engagement and participation in the energy system 
4.5 A new public entity could take a stronger position in promoting and supporting 
customers to switch supplier. As the SOC notes, the Scottish Government has already 
part-funded Citrus Energy to provide an impartial switching service (EY 2018). This 
could be developed and expanded. The public entity could work to improve 
FRQVXPHUV¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHLUELOOVDQGVXSSRUWWKHXVHRIVPDUWPHWHUand other 
data to empower consumers, increasing the potential for digital innovation to benefit 
consumers across society. 
4.6 The public body could also work to increase FRQVXPHUV¶ HQJDJHPHQW ZLWK
energy efficiency and low carbon energy technologies and energy services, enhancing 
their potential role in demand side management. A further function could be to provide 
information and advice (and perhaps also financial support) to boost local (co-) 
ownership of energy assets and participation in decision making about energy 
developments and technologies.  
Reducing costs to consumers 
4.7 Aligned with the rather more focused aim set out in the SOC, the fourth potential 
purpose of a new publicly-owned body could be to recycle energy market profits back 
to consumers, lowering bills and helping to tackle the fuel bills element of the causes 
of fuel poverty. As well as involvement in the commercially competitive retail market, 
such an objective might also entail supporting generation cost reductions in order to 
lower the wholesale costs of power, or provision of alternative infrastructures and 
technologies to deliver heat at lower cost to consumers than they are currently paying. 
It might also involve supporting local supply models where local generation resources 
are linked more directly to local consumers, potentially avoiding them paying the full 
market costs of energy whilst being able to retain more value locally. 
4.8 These four purposes are related and mutually reinforcing and if sufficient 
resource were available, several might be addressed at once. They are all being 
addressed to varying degrees through current Scottish Government policy, as well as 
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at UK level. The creation of a POEC provides the opportunity to better coordinate 
those existing policy initiatives and provide strategic oversight as well as various types 
of support for on-the-ground delivery. 
4.9 These various potential purposes are already reflected to different degrees in 
existing not-for-profit and publicly owned energy initiatives. The next two sections 
review some of these, as instructive for how a POEC might develop in Scotland. 
UK Experience of Publicly-owned and Not-for-profit Energy Companies 
4.10 In a review of local authority engagement in UK energy systems, Webb et al. 
found a wide diversity of activities and business structures, with a mix of in-house, 
commercial and not-for-profit entities including municipal energy service companies 
(ESCos), private sector-led ESCos and community benefit societies. Motivations 
include decarbonising local energy, improving energy security and saving on energy 
costs. However energy provision and demand management are increasingly also 
being seen as a source of revenue (Webb et al. 2017). Three examples are reviewed 
here. 
Robin Hood Energy 
4.11 Robin Hood Energy is a licensed energy supply company wholly owned by 
Nottingham City Council, established in 2015. 5RELQ+RRG(QHUJ\¶V aim is to provide 
affordable energy, and was launched with pre-payment meter customers particularly 
in mind. Robin Hood succeeded in turning a profit this year, one of only very few small 
suppliers to reach break-even point in such a short period. It now offers eight white 
label5 products to other entities including several local authorities. 
4.12 Robin Hood voluntarily participates in the Warm Home Discount scheme and 
offers smart meters (in spite of being below the compliance threshold in terms of 
customer numbers). The use of smart meter data in particular has allowed Robin Hood 
WRSURYLGHHYLGHQFHRIFXVWRPHUV¶SURPSWSD\PHQWDQGWKHUHIRUHHQDEOHGFXVWRPHUV
to move onto cheaper tariffs faster than otherwise. Robin Hood also works to ensure 
                                            
5
 White label products are provided by a licensed supplier (in this case Robin Hood 
Energy) to another entity that sells that product on, separately branded in line with the 
EX\LQJHQWLW\¶VREMHFWLYHV([DPSOHVRIZKLWHODEHOFRQWUDFWVDUH5RELQ+RRG¶VZKLWH
labels with Islington Council (Angelic Energy) and with Liverpool Council (LECCY), 
DQG66(¶VZLWK0DUNVDQG6SHQFHUM&S Energy). 
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that as few customers as possible are on their standard variable tariff and is in 
discussion with Ofgem about ways of avoiding the standard variable tariff being the 
default. 5RELQ+RRG¶V%RDUGLVPDGHXSRI&LW\&RXQFLOORUVDQGVWDIIhave moved from 
being local council employees to being employed by Robin Hood. 
4.13 5RELQ +RRG¶V RSHUDWLQJ FRVWV DUH DURXQG 2.8m per year6, with staff costs 
representing about £1.9m of this. Set up costs were just under £2m, which is low 
compared to comparable companies. Part of the reason for this is that Robin Hood 
spent relatively little on marketing, and less than most comparable companies on 
consultancy fees. 
Bristol Energy 
4.14 Bristol Energy began trading in 2015 as a licensed gas and electricity supply 
company owned by Bristol City Council. The company operates independently of the 
City Council. Staff are employed by Bristol Energy and the Board has a Bristol City 
Council representative as well as other Non-Executive Directors. The process of taking 
the company from initial proposal to fully licensed supplier took around five years. 
Objectives include generating revenue for the Council, addressing fuel poverty and 
providing a high standard of customer service. Bristol Energy is not yet profitable ± 
something that is far from unusual for the smaller companies in the supply market, and 
in particular for socially motivated companies that emphasise compliance and 
affordability for their customers. The company expects to be profitable (and begin 
repaying Council loans) by 2021. It has around 60,000 customers across GB, including 
13,000 in Bristol (7% of city households), to whom it offers the cheapest tariff in the 
city. 
4.15 Bristol Energy runs the Fuel Good Fund, which supports Bristol charities 
working to tackle fuel poverty as part of a wider Council-led initiative. The Fund is 
financed from donations made each time a new customer signs up to Bristol Energy 
(£15 per fuel, £30 for a dual fuel customer). Bristol Energy trialled an at-cost social 
tariff, which was offered directly to fuel poor households via referrals from charities, 
                                            
6
 Borrowing, which includes commodity costs (to cover the purchase of gas and 
electricity), is around £5m per year. 
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but sign-up rates fell very far below projections ± demonstrating the challenge of 
engaging with some of the most vulnerable and disengaged consumers.  
Our Power 
4.16 Our Power is not strictly speaking a publicly owned company, but it has many 
of the attributes of a publicly owned company. Established in 2015, Our Power is a 
Community Benefit Society with subsidiaries operating as a licensed energy supply 
company (Our Power Energy Supply Ltd) and engaging in renewable generation and 
district heating. It is owned by its 66 members and is asset-locked and non-profit 
distributing. Membership is open to Social Landlords, Local Authorities and 
Community Controlled Organisations who collectively own over 200,000 homes. Our 
Power offers a void management service to its members which includes a switch to 
Our Power during the void period (though residents can then choose whether to stay 
with Our Power or switch). 
4.17 Our Power now has over 27,000 customers, with tariffs available to the wider 
market to help to gain scale, with the objective of becoming profitable by 2021. Tariffs 
do not vary by payment method and Our Power has one of the lowest prepayment 
tariffs in GB. Our Power introduced the first alternative tariff for customers with 
restricted meters (i.e. households on Total Heat Total Control or ComfortPlus tariffs) 
offering significant savings for the majority of these customers. It also has a number 
of partnerships with local authorities and community-controlled organisations 
(including Hebrides Energy to offer a range of local tariffs in the Hebrides) and is 
engaged in renewables development and exploring ways to use renewable generation 
to benefit fuel poor customers. 90% of its electricity is from renewable sources. 
4.18 Our Power has benefited from Scottish Government support, including an initial 
grant for feasibility work and repayable loans of £2.75m and £3.25m million from the 
Scottish Government and loans of £1m and £.6m from Social Investment Scotland. 
Investment support has also come from the Joseph Rowntree and Esmee Fairbairn 
Foundations, and Tudor, Barrow Cadbury and Robertson Trusts. Further working 
capital was raised in 2017 via a social purpose bond which raised £4.5m. 
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Overseas Experience of Publicly-owned Entities 
German municipal energy companies 
4.19 German municipal energy companies are often cited as examples of successful 
publicly owned companies. In fact the motivations and structures of these companies 
vary widely and some are more commercially successful than others. In Germany 
there is a legacy of small, local grids and legal structures available for municipal 
services. Unlike in Britain, although privatised, the sector is subject to concessions 
which are issued by local municipalities7 and re-municipalisation has been relatively 
more straightforward to achieve where concessions were up for renewal. Even then, 
there have been cases of the incumbent operator taking legal action against the 
municipality that is trying to take on the energy assets. Depending on local 
circumstances, the result is a mix across municipalities of private-public partnerships 
and wholly public entities. Public backing (e.g. via a referendum in Hamburg) has been 
key. 
The Swedish Energy Agency 
4.20 The Swedish Energy Agency works largely as an energy policy delivery agency, 
and innovation and R&D funder covering renewables, smart grids and low carbon 
vehicles and transport fuels. It was formed in 1998 to support uptake of new energy 
technologies and its research funding is targeted in particular at industry and 
supporting commercialisation. The agency produces evaluations, national statistics 
and consultation responses. It manages instruments such as the Electricity Certificate 
System and the EU Emission Trading System. The Swedish District Heating Board is 
an independent unit within the agency and acts as a mediator between district heating 
companies and their customers regarding district heating contracts and network 
access and management, to support compliance ZLWK6ZHGHQ¶V'LVWULFW+HDWLQJ$FW 
The Danish Energy Agency 
4.21 The Danish Energy Agency is similar in many respects to the Swedish Energy 
Agency, but acts more as a regulator, for example administering subsidies and 
supplier obligations, designing and enforcing energy labelling schemes for buildings 
                                            
7
 The networks themselves are publicly owned by regional/local government and municipalities tender 
concessions competitively to operators for fixed periods (much like the rail sector in Britain). 
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and products, managing the EU Emissions Trading System in Denmark, and 
regulating the biogas industry. It has a regulatory role in relation to energy generation, 
supply and consumption, including in buildings. It was established in 1976 and has 
360 staff. It runs a range of low carbon partnership programmes overseas, and is 
responsible for managing energy systems models and providing analysis. The 
Swedish and Danish agencies are examples of the value of an independent body that 
can take a longer-term, strategic view (beyond political cycles) of energy policy 
delivery. 
General Issues, Opportunities and Challenges 
Targeting fuel poverty  
4.22 As noted above, one fifth of Scottish homes are off the gas grid and off-grid 
areas tend to have higher rates of fuel poverty than on-grid areas. The Scottish Fuel 
3RYHUW\ 6WUDWHJLF :RUNLQJ *URXS¶V  UHSRUW UHFRPPHQGHG WKDW WKH 6FRWWLVK
Government identify specific measures to support customers in rural and off-gas grid 
areas who suffer from higher energy prices on average than the rest of Scotland. The 
role of a POEC in relation to tackling off-gas grid fuel poverty merits further 
consideration, in particular in relation to consumers with electric heating, given the low 
margins in the electricity supply market and the likelihood of a publicly owned supply 
company being able to offer significant tariff reductions for electricity compared to 
other suppliers. For these consumers, providing support for switching may be as 
significant as offering a new tariff in the market8. 
4.23 The 6FRWWLVK)XHO3RYHUW\6WUDWHJLF:RUNLQJ*URXS¶Vreport also recommended 
that a new fuel poverty strategy should include direct support for the fuel poor on 
managing their energy use, switching to better tariffs, ensuring correct billing and debt 
relief. If its purpose is considered in broader terms than simply as a not-for-profit 
retailer of gas and electricity, the publicly owned energy company presents an 
                                            
8
 The 400,000 customers with restricted meters in Scotland ± such as those on Economy 10 
tariffs ± have traditionally been subject to additional constraints on their ability to switch. At 
present, few mid-tier or small suppliers are able to supply these customers. In practice, some 
are more expensive to supply than others, and as a group, they are difficult for suppliers to 
price. The CMA has imposed new conditions on suppliers, requiring them to make all their 
single-rate electricity tariffs available to all domestic electricity customers on restricted meters 
(CMA 2016b).  
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opportunity to provide exactly this sort of support. Such a role for the POEC could be 
articulated under the provisions of forthcoming fuel poverty legislation. 
Interaction with local initiatives 
4.24 The business or operational objectives of a new national energy body could 
support local initiatives explicitly or equally might be in tension with them if it set up in 
a way that effectively competes for resources and customers. As local authorities 
across Scotland become increasingly active in establishing ESCos, investing in energy 
projects and delivering on energy efficiency objectives, there is likely to be an 
increasing diversity of approaches taken across Scotland. A national entity has the 
potential to provide a central resource to support these various initiatives, but there is 
a risk it could stifle local innovation if it were too centralising and directive. If the POEC 
were solely a supply company, it might support local initiatives through white label 
arrangements ± alternatively it could, potentially at least, end up in competition with 
other emerging not-for-profit supply company initiatives.  
4.25 One potential impact of the establishment of a POEC could be increased local 
employment in the area in which the POEC is headquartered, and through local supply 
chains if the POEC had a role in investing in energy generation or infrastructure (for 
example heat networks or through supplier obligations on energy efficiency). 
Increased local employment would be expected in turn to have a positive effect on 
incomes and thus potentially on local fuel poverty levels.  
Interaction with other policy initiatives  
4.26 As highlighted above (paragraph 4.23) there are clear linkages with the 
forthcoming Fuel Poverty Strategy.  
4.27 The objectives of the Energy Efficient Scotland programme9 also clearly align 
with those of a POEC: as energy efficiency improves under the Energy Efficient 
Scotland programme, this will reinforce the positive effects of efforts to make energy 
more affordable spearheaded by the POEC (Scottish Government 2018c). However, 
thought will need to be given to the 32(&¶V UROH LI DQ\ LQ GHOLYHULQJ the Energy 
                                            
9
 The Energy Efficient Scotland programme is the suite of policies and projects aimed at delivering the 
National Infrastructure Priority on energy efficiency. The ambition is for a step change in the energy 
HIILFLHQF\RI6FRWODQG¶VGRPHVtic and non-domestic buildings over the next 20 years. 
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Company Obligation, given that the ECO is also a major source of funding under 
Energy Efficient Scotland. 
4.28 Further policy developments in relation to the objectives set out in the Energy 
Strategy that are expected soon are expected to include, at least, a strategic statement 
on local energy as well as statements on electricity and gas policy and market 
development. Again, these Scottish Government policy statements could have a direct 
bearing how the POEC develops and the effectiveness of its operational design. 
Period of rapid change in the energy system and market regulation  
4.29 There are many new small suppliers in the market and some are experimenting 
with extremely low margin tariffs and fixed bills. The effect on the supply market of this 
is yet to play out. Over the past two years, Ofgem has been moving to introduce a 
series of regulatory changes that aim to strengthen competition and increase 
consumer protection in the supply market. This includes UHIRUPLQJWKHµVXSSOLHUKXE¶
model (in which suppliers are the primary interface between consumers and the 
energy system, acting as WKHµKXE¶RIWKHPDUNHW), and moving to half-hourly settlement 
(use of half-hourly smart consumption data to settle FRQVXPHUV¶ bills), as well as 
considering how time-of-use tariffs may be rolled out (where the prices consumers pay 
per unit of energy change across the day, and are cheaper when the system needs 
more demand to balance and more expensive when demand is high and the system 
would benefit from demand EHLQJµGLDOOHGGRZQ¶. There are also very recent moves 
by Ofgem to review supplier licensing in relation to the safeguards for customers of 
failed suppliers and the conditions for market entry for new suppliers. 
4.30 Further change is occurring in the market in relation to finding innovative ways 
to link local generation and demand. The Scottish Energy Strategy sets out a vision 
for local energy, the full delivery of which implies some change in the relationships 
between, and responsibilities of, generators and suppliers to enable greater matching 
of local generation (and other energy assets such as storage) with local demand. 
2IJHP¶V ,QQRYDWLRQ /LQN10 was set up to test new business models in the market, 
including peer-to-peer electricity trading. 
                                            
10
 See https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/about-us/how-we-engage/innovation-link  
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4.31 The importance of data in the energy system is increasing. A new POEC will 
face a rapidly growing set of opportunities and challenges around the collection and 
use of data. There is an opportunity from the smart meter rollout to better target 
support to vulnerable and fuel poor consumers, and to supplement this with 
increasingly sophisticated data collection, monitoring and analysis techniques. New 
intermediaries are emerging in the market, offering novel data services. The protection 
and proper use of data will become even more salient.  
4.32 There is a wider move in the electricity system towards a Distribution System 
Operator (DSO) model, where the distribution network operators would have a greater 
role in managing the system at the distribution network level. There are different 
potential ways in which this will work and the benefits and costs will fall differently 
depending on which model (or models) are eventually adopted. This shifting landscape 
in the electricity system may have implications for a Scottish public energy company. 
Similarly, the new energy service models that are emerging, including around 
providing low carbon heat, may prove to be significant market disruptors. Again, the 
implications for customers (and different groups of customers) and the wider market 
are still uncertain.  
4.33 Taken together, these changes ± and the uncertainties they bring ± suggest a 
need for the POEC to have a very clearly defined purpose, against which its business 
model can be designed in a way that enables adaptation to changing circumstances 
whilst maintaining delivery of its core aims. 
Governance and democratic accountability 
4.34 Governance and accountability are concerns for any new public body. There 
are a number of approaches that might be taken, some of which are described in the 
SOC (EY 2018). Municipal energy companies on the continent may provide good 
examples of how local democratic structures can be integrated with energy company 
governance to ensure accountability. Statoil (now Equinor) is a further instructive 
example ± for its first decade of operation, the company was obliged to take strategic 
decisions to Parliament for democratic scrutiny, which was critical to a more social and 
environmental remit for Statoil (Cumbers et al. 2013). The Scottish Fuel Poverty 
Strategic Working Group recommended that the Scottish Government should involve 
people who are experiencing fuel poverty in the development of the new fuel poverty 
strategy and its delivery and evaluation (SFPSWG 2016). The same principle should 
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apply to the publicly owned energy company, where those whom the company is being 
established to benefit should be consulted on its mission and operation. A public 
company that has a direct role in supplying customers with services and charging for 
those will need particularly robust governance arrangements, transparently managed. 
Particular issues and challenges related to setting up an Energy Supply 
Company 
Customer acquisition 
4.35 Prudent targets are sensible given the relatively low switching rates in the 
market. Robin Hood Energy set a target of 30,000 customers per year initially, for 
example. $V WKH 6FRWWLVK )XHO 3RYHUW\ 6WUDWHJLF:RUNLQJ *URXS SXW LW ³$GYLFH RQ
switching will require a concerted and sustained effort to achieve better engagement 
with the fuel poor to overcome the propensity not to switch ± especially in rural 
6FRWODQG´6)36:*S.28). Given state aid rules, which would suggest that the 
Scottish Government would have to be cautious in its promotion of a government-
owned supply company, the company itself might have to invest in a concerted 
customer acquisition campaign. As noted in the SOC, the social enterprise Citrus-
Energy offers an existing impartial switching service, and is working in partnership with 
the Scottish Government programme Home Energy Scotland (EY 2018). 
Customer retention 
4.36 Customer retention is perhaps even more important than initial acquisition, 
because by definition these acquired customers are customers who have switched at 
least once before to a new supplier DQGDUHWKHUHIRUHPRUHµPRELOH¶DQGOHVVHDV\WR
retain than customers who have never switched). 
Consultancy costs 
4.37 These are inevitable and may be substantial irrespective of whether a White 
Label or full Licence model is chosen. Due diligence is therefore vital, but takes time 
(which in turn may be a challenge given the timescales implied by the commitment to 
have the POEC operational by 2021). 
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Hedging strategy 
4.38 Complex and essential, hedging refers to the ability to buy power over different 
timescales at set prices to manage risk of exposure to changes in price. It is critical to 
profitability, and a key source of risk. 
Credit cover requirement 
4.39 Some early non-Big 6 suppliers were caught out by high credit cover costs 
when wholesale prices suddenly escalated in the late 2000s. For any supply company, 
estimation and provision of credit cover must be well managed to reduce risk. 
Customer relationship management  
4.40 This is key to the ability of a supplier to provide good customer service, which 
in turn directly affects reputation. Reputation is an important factor in customer 
acquisition and retention. Customer service is arguably particularly important for a 
publicly owned company where expectations may be higher. 
Settlement and billing 
4.41 It is essential to get the right IT in place to deal with customer billing and the off 
the shelf options are not necessarily the most cost effective in the medium-term, 
implying complex procurement processes (specifying precisely the system 
requirements and then performing due diligence on suppliers). 
Compliance costs 
4.42 Various supplier obligations become relevant as a supply company grows. For 
example, above 250,000 meter supply points (which with dual fuel customers could 
mean 125,000 customers), the Renewables Obligation will apply to a supplier. The 
Energy Company Obligation, smart meter roll out and other schemes will also apply 
over certain thresholds. These schemes can add significant costs to a supply business 
and tipping just over thresholds is a risk that needs managing. Thresholds are 
changing for some of these schemes, implying a degree of uncertainty in the medium 
term about which compliance costs will be applicable (see for example BEIS 2018). 
Transparency  
4.43 A publicly owned energy supply company will inevitably be subject to greater 
scrutiny than private supply companies, including through Freedom of Information 
requests and media attention. This has been the experience of local authority owned 
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supply companies in the UK to date. As well as reacting to externally-driven 
requirements for transparency, a publicly owned company would be very likely to wish 
proactively to make information available to the public about the operation and 
performance of the company. Managing the flow of information for transparency 
purposes will cost more for a publicly owned supply company than for its private 
competitors. 
State Aid restrictions and potential conflicts of interest 
4.44 Because the supply market is a fully competitive one, a Scottish Government-
owned supply company would need to be sufficiently independent from the Scottish 
Government to avoid any potential breach of rules aimed at preventing anti-
competitive behaviour. This means, for example, that public resources could not be 
used to promote a government-owned supply company in the market, and the 
company would have to compete on equal terms with others if it were tendering for 
public sector contracts. (The recent example of Bristol Council procuring energy from 
a supplier other than its own Bristol Energy is instructive.)  Potential conflicts of interest 
would need attention too ± for example with respect to the powers over the 
implementation of supplier obligations (the Energy Company Obligation and Warm 
Home Discount) that are now devolved to Scotland. 
5. Conclusions  
5.1 This scoping review highlights many of the same issues raised by stakeholders 
in reODWLRQ WR D 32(& DW WKH (-):¶V Lnquiry on the draft Energy Strategy. Those 
stakeholders wanted to see a POEC that could take a strategic oversight role in the 
energy sector, driving innovation and supporting investment in and deployment of low 
carbon energy technologies, coordinating energy efficiency activities to achieve a step 
FKDQJH LPSURYHPHQW LQ 6FRWODQG¶V KRXVLQJ VWRFN DQG supporting local energy 
systems and helping to drive down the cost of energy11.  
5.2 The focus on consumer bills and fuel poverty in the SOC takes the POEC in a 
particular direction, away from having this more strategic role, and narrows down its 
purpose to that of an energy supplier. As the SOC shows, there is scope for a Scottish 
                                            
11
 These stakeholder responses are set out in detail in Appendix IV. 
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publicly owned energy supply company to save customers money by returning the 
profit that private companies make back to consumers. Profit margins in the supply 
industry are low, and there is already a wide range of tariffs and small suppliers 
available to consumers. These two factors mean that customer switching to the POEC 
is likely to PDNHDVODUJHDGLIIHUHQFHWRFRQVXPHUV¶ELOOVDVWKHIDFWWKDW32(&PD\
be able to offer new competitive tariffs. This puts HPSKDVLVRQWKH32(&¶VSRWHQWLDO
for customer acquisition, and for driving up switching rates. The existing not-for-profit 
supply companies reviewed here exhibit a range of rates of success in the market, 
although they do demonstrate that a socially-minded supply company can make a 
difference to fuel poor and vulnerable consumers. 
5.3 The other models of public energy company reviewed here, for example state 
energy agencies and municipal energy companies, provide additional examples of 
what a POEC could achieve in terms of supporting strategic action in the energy sector 
and public development and ownership of energy assets. However, this review has 
focused more on the potential purpose of a POEC in the Scottish context, setting out 
four overarching objectives a POEC might have:  
x Creating new infrastructure platforms 
x Accelerating wider energy system transformation 
x Increasing engagement and participation in the energy system 
x Reducing costs to consumers 
5.4 The review of evidence and stakeholder views presented here suggests that a 
Scottish publicly owned energy company can deliver on a number of these objectives. 
It would also suggest that it is possible to integrate these objectives into planning for 
the POEC, and that it is essential to consider these in the context of how the POEC 
will interact with existing energy policy initiatives.  
5.5 The EJFW Committee may wish to support further public debate on both the 
purpose of the POEC and how it will work alongside existing policy, through its work 
on the POEC. Based on this scoping review, the EJFW Committee may wish to 
consider the following questions in any call for evidence or further inquiry it may make 
in relation to the POEC: 
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x How might a Scottish energy supply company work best to support fuel poverty 
reduction?   
x How can the POEC be best designed to maximise alignment with wider Scottish 
energy policy objectives, and to remove all potential tensions with other policy 
objectives, (for example around creating integrated local energy systems that link 
local supply and demand and retain value locally, or around decarbonising heat 
through a differentiated and locally appropriate suite of policy interventions)?  
x Should a new Scottish POEC be more than solely a licensed energy supply 
company? How might the POEC be designed to make space for objectives and 
functions beyond the retail of gas and electricity? What benefits might this have?  
 The POEC could be purposefully designed to accommodate objectives and 
functions beyond energy retailing. This could be achieved for example by 
the supply company becoming a subsidiary of a wider group of companies 
with complementary roles. Or the mission and activities of the supply 
company could be purposively aligned with those of a strategic oversight 
body established in parallel with the supply company (and which might have 
a governance relationship with the supply company e.g. through 
representation RQ WKH VXSSO\ FRPSDQ\¶V %RDUG 2U WKH VXSSO\ FRPSDQ\
could be designed with flexibility and growth built in at the outset, as 
suggested in the Strategic Outline Case. 
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7. Appendices 
 
Appendix I: The Safeguard Tariff 
'DWDRQWKHFXUUHQWOHYHOVIRU2IJHP¶VYXOQHUDEOHVDIHJXDUGWDULII are provided below. 
 
For the North of Scotland region, based on a simple prepayment meter: 
Gas ± standing charges are 26.96 pence/day; unit price is 3.31 pence/kWh 
Electricity ± standing charges are 28.97 pence/day; unit price is 14.61 pence/kWh 
 
For the South of Scotland region, based on a simple prepayment meter: 
Gas ± standing charges are 26.96 pence/day; unit price is 3.31 pence/kWh 
Electricity ± standing charges are 28.97 pence/day; unit price is 13.65 pence/kWh 
 
For comparison, the average (arithmetic mean) for the safeguard tariff across all GB 
regions is 3.36 pence/kWh for gas and 14.19 pence/kWh for electricity. 
 
6RXUFH 2IJHP¶V 3UHSD\PHQW 3ULFH &DS )$4 GRFXPHQW $SULO  DYDLODEOH DW
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/safeguard-tariff-prepayment-
reporting-template-and-faq  
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Appendix II: The Electricity Market in More Detail 
Suppliers, generators and Non Physical Traders (for example, banks) trade electricity 
in the GB electricity wholesale market ± they are called Parties in the Balancing and 
Settlement Code that governs the market. Elexon is the company that administers the 
Code on behalf of Parties, providing and procuring services to implement the Code 
and ensure the wholesale market runs efficiently and accurately.  
Electricity is currently not stored in significant volumes and generation and demand 
must be kept in balance at all times across the grid. Electricity is traded in half-hour 
blocks called Settlement Periods, for which suppliers assess demand (from their 
customers) and strike contracts with generators or on power exchanges12. Contracts 
for electricity can be struck well ahead of delivery, sometimes several years, right 
down to the time of delivery (the Submission Deadline).  
Electricity is usually traded far in advance to cover the minimum amount needed to 
match demand - RIWHQ UHIHUUHG WR DV µEDVHORDG¶ 7KLV WHQGV WR EH FRQWUDFWHG IRU
bilaterally between generators and suppliers for example directly through Power 
Purchase Agreements. Power exchanges tend to be used to adjust baseload to meet 
the expected demand on a specific day, usually closer to the delivery time and based 
on things like the weather forecast for that day. 
Within each Settlement Period, National Grid Electricity Transmission (NGET) 
manages the real-time matching of generation and demand. One of the main tools it 
uses to do this is the Balancing Mechanism, where generators and suppliers that are 
IOH[LEOHHQRXJKFDQPDNHµ2IIHUV¶WRLQFUHDVHJHQHUDWLRQRUUHGXFHGHPDQGIRUDJLYHQ
SULFHDQGµ%LGV¶WRUeduce generation or increase demand for a given price, at very 
short notice. NGET uses the Balancing Mechanism to match supply and demand in 
each half hour, in real-time, by accepting Bids or Offers depending on whether the 
system needs more or less generation (or demand) to stay in balance. 
After each Settlement Period, imbalance charges are payable by Parties (suppliers, 
generators and Non Physical Traders) that have failed to use, generate or sell exactly 
the amount of electricity they contracted for, taking into account any Bids and Offers 
                                            
12
 A note on power exchanges: buyers and sellers of electricity buy and sell 
anonymously ± i.e. buyers do not know which seller they are buying from and vice 
versa. 
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accepted. The differences between what they contracted for and what actually 
occurred are called imbalances.  
Where any Party does not meet its imbalance charges (i.e. defaults on payment), all 
the Parties pick up the cost proportionally. However, all Parties have to lodge a 
GHSRVLWFDOOHG µ&UHGLW&RYHU¶ WRUHGXFHWKHULVN WKDW WKHUHVWRI WKH LQGXVWU\ZLOOEH
UHTXLUHGWRSD\IRUDGHIDXOWLQJ3DUW\¶VVHWWOHPHQW OLDELOLWLHV&UHGLW&RYHU OHYHOVDUH
set by Elexon based on a calculation of imbalance exposure. 
The following diagrams show in more detail how the physical infrastructure of the 
electricity system (in blue) interacts with the commercial arrangements of the electricity 
market (in orange), as well as how electricity flows are physically controlled (green). 
Figure 3 shows this in simple terms:  
 
Figure 3 ± Simple model of the energy system and market 
 
Figure 4 below shows the current ± or incumbent ± model of the GB electricity system 
in more detail than provided in the body of this report.  
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Figure 4 ± Detail of the incumbent electricity system model  
Source: Ongoing research by Damien Frame, Electronic and Electrical Engineering, 
University of Strathclyde 
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Appendix III: Relevant Scottish Energy Facts and Figures 
Total energy consumption in Scotland breaks down roughly to 50% for heat, and 25% 
HDFKIRUHOHFWULFLW\DQGWUDQVSRUW*DVFRQVXPSWLRQLQ6FRWODQG¶VGRPHVWLFSURSHUWLHV
has gone down 30% since 2006. 20% of Scottish households are off the gas grid. The 
energ\HIILFLHQF\RI6FRWODQG¶VKRXVLQJVWRFNKDVEHHQ increasing, with at least 100 
mm of loft insulation is installed in an estimated 94% of lofts (up 12% on 2010 levels) 
and a high standard of insulation (300 mm or more) now in 30% of homes (up from 
only 5% in 2010). Levels of insulation (both loft and wall) are higher in the social sector 
than in the private sector. 53% of walls (all types) are insulated in the private sector 
compared to 71% in the social sector. 62% of lofts are insulated to 200 mm or more in 
the private sector compared to 78% in the social sector.   
Overall, domestic energy consumption (heat and electricity) has fallen 20% since the 
2005-2007 baseline period. The change in average direct debit bills in Scotland since 
2004 has followed wider GB trends, increasing 84% for gas and 52% for electricity.  
Sources:  
Energy in Scotland 2018 Key Facts 
http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0053/00531699.pdf  
and  
Scottish House Condition Survey Key Findings 2016 
http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2017/12/5401/348227  
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Appendix IV: POEC Evidence from the EJFW CommitWHH¶V,nquiry on the 
draft Scottish Energy Strategy 
In responding tR WKH (-):¶V LQTXLU\ WWF VWDWHG ³,QWHUQDWLRQDOO\ JRYHUQPHQW
agencies and energy companies have had an important role in overcoming market 
failure, capacity building, and driving forward the transition to clean energy and energy 
efficiency. There is a role for a similar body with a broad suite of responsibilities in 
6FRWODQG´ 
2IJHP¶V UHVSRQVH to the Scottish GRYHUQPHQW¶V consultation on the draft Energy 
Strategy included the statement³7KHYDVWDPRXQWVRIGDWDWKDWWKHVPDUWWUDQVLWLRQ
will generate should also permit greater diversity in tariff offerings. However, as the 
retail environment becomes more diverse and complex, providing an appropriate level 
of service for those not able to navigate the market could become more challenging. 
Whilst many of the changes we are witnessing with regards to new business models 
and products are potentially positive, it is important that the less engaged and those 
in vulnerable siWXDWLRQVDUHDOVRDEOHWREHQHILW´$QG: ³:HDUHUHIRUPLQJWKHUXOHERRN
to future proof our regulation and put responsibility on suppliers to understand what is 
right and fair for their customers. This will ensure that customers can benefit from 
technological change and innovation in the market, while protecting them from new 
risks. We will ensure that energy suppliers who fail to put the needs of consumers at 
the heart of their business will continue to face tough action. We welcome the Scottish 
Government¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRHQJDJHZLWKWKH8.*RYHUQPHQW2IJHPDQGFRQVXPHU
JURXSVWRVHFXUHHIIHFWLYHUHJXODWLRQRIWKHUHWDLOHQHUJ\PDUNHW´ 
And specifically:  
³$ *RYHUQPHQW-owned energy company: There are already various public sector 
models emerging in the energy supply market. For example, Nottingham City Council 
have set up Robin Hood Energy and Bristol City Council created Bristol Energy. In 
6FRWODQG ZH VHH ³2XU 3RZHU´ ZKLFK LV URRWHG LQ WKH VRFLDO KRXVLQJ DQG ORFDO
government sectors. As such, public sector ownership per se is consistent with and 
enabled by current regulation. If the Scottish Government wanted to act as a supplier, 
a Government-owned energy company would, of course, have to comply with 
regulatory arrangements like any other. State aid matters would also be a 
consideration for the Scottish Government as they would be in any other publicly 
supported intervention that could affect competitive markets. Strategic support for 
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innovation can be crucial in overcoming the market failures in developing new 
technologies and approaches. We have set up the Innovation Link to provide a space 
where innovators can come to us and seek advice on the regulatory implications of 
their ideas and would be very happy to talk to the Scottish Government about the 
modeOVWKH\DUHORRNLQJDWDQGH[SHUWLVHZHFDQSURYLGH´ 
&26/$¶V UHVSRQVH QRWHG ³(OHFWHGPHPEHUVPD\ZLVK WRFRQVLGHUEDVHGRQ ORFDO
policy of councils, an increased role for local authorities in a new Scottish energy 
supply system. Examples of municipal energy companies such as in Sweden, 
'HQPDUNDQGSDUWVRI WKH8.FRXOGEHRI UHOHYDQFHKHUH´$QG: ³&RPPLWWHG WR WKH
principles of local democracy and community action, members may also wish to 
explore a more formal and strategic role for local authorities in facilitating 
community/local ownership of renewable energy sources, to ensure that greater 
financial benefit is retained in communities. Local authorities can potentially provide 
important skills and resources, such as technical expertise, project development, 
finance and political support. This topic requires further exploration, not least to 
determine which types of renewable schemes would lend themselves to such an 
DSSURDFK´ 
&RPPXQLW\(QHUJ\6FRWODQG¶VNicholas Gubbins observed³:HIHHO² certainly from 
a community perspective ² that if there are going to be more and more extensive 
community-owned or community-engaged energy developments, we are going to 
need much better economies of scale. We also think that a number of collective and 
facilitative roles could be undertaken by some form of co-ordinating organisation. It 
does not necessarily have to be a Government one, but if there were to be such an 
organisation, it could assist in a number of quite useful ways²both in developing new 
projects and in helping to underwrite or guarantee or in assisting with the various things 
WKDWDUHQHFHVVDU\WRJHQHUDWHVXFKHFRQRPLHVRIVFDOH´ 
Lindsay Roberts6FRWWLVK5HQHZDEOHVVDLG ³:HDJUHHWKDW LI LW LVFUHDWHG LWPXVW
add value and should not duplicate things that are out there already. We are coming 
round to the view that it could be a very useful mechanism as a front door. There are 
a huge number of projects and organisations out there to help communities, but 
because there is so much support, it is sometimes very difficult for them to know who 
to go to first and which door to knock on. A one-stop shop begins to open up options 
for communities and to help them to travel through the project development process 
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or whatever it is that they are looking towards to get them involved with renewable 
HQHUJ\´ 
Joan McNaughton, Climate Group VDLG³:HFDQQRWKDYHRYHUVLJKWWKURXJKDSLHFHRI
policy machinery at the political level. We need something that is closer to the practical 
side. If my memory serves me correctly, some of the examples that were cited in the 
chapter are designed to do that. In particular, the Swedish energy agency is there to 
help oversee execution and to make sure that it is delivered in an integrated way 
across all the different sectors. For me, there is a question mark over that area; there 
might be a gap that needs to be filled. There is a case for a bit of machinery that is 
distinct from the economic regulator and from Government, but which has the 
accountability to report on what is actually delivered and to spot problems before they 
become a maWWHURISRVWKRFDFFRXQWDELOLW\EHFDXVHWKH\KDYHQRWEHHQVROYHG´$QG: 
³,KDGLQPLQGWKH&RPPLWWHHRQ&OLPDWH&KDQJHZKHQ,ZDVWDONLQJDERXWSRVWKRF
accountability. It is not there to spot problems early on and to help people to devise 
solutions. Although it is doing great work, it is not quite the kind of body that you need 
for the kind of role that I would like to see, which is around implementation and 
VHSDUDWLQJWKDWIURPWKHSROLF\GHYHORSPHQWSURFHVV´ 
The EJFW &RPPLWWHH¶VOHWWHU of 30 June 2017 to Mr. Wheelhouse stated interest in 
EHWWHU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ ³WKH EDODQFH RI SROLF\ EHWZHHQ ORFDO DQG QDWLRQDO SOXV WKH
suggestion of a gap between national policy and local reality), and complexity of 
HQHUJ\SROLF\DQGWKHFDVHIRUDQDWLRQDODJHQF\WRRYHUVHHLW´$QGVWDWHG³*LYHQWKH
scale and complexity of the many policy strands covered by the strategy, it will be 
important to ensure good governance, policy expertise, cross-party buy-in (as there 
has been for climate change) and long-term ownership. Sitting on the edge of a few 
FLYLOVHUYDQWV¶GHVNVZHZHUHWROGZLOOQRWEHHQRXJK7KLVLVDVWUDWHJ\WKHOLIHVSDQ
of which extends beyond the usual electoral and budgetary cycles. The Committee on 
Climate Change was mentioned, as was the Danish Energy Agency, and the model of 
Transport Scotland for large infrastructure projects. Another witness underlined the 
importance of a boG\ WR VSRW SUREOHPV EHIRUH WKH\ EHFDPH ³D PDWWHU RI SRVW KRF
DFFRXQWDELOLW\´,QWKHLQWHUHVWVRIHQVXULQJFRQWLQXLW\RIGHOLYHU\IRUWKHVWUDWHJ\WKH
Committee recommends a long term framework be put in place; one which could 
include the establishment of DQLQGHSHQGHQWERG\´SDUD 
In responding to the committee, Mr. Wheelhouse did not address POEC explicitly, but 
VDLG ³:H UHPDLQ UHVROXWH LQ WKH WDVN WR HUDGLFDWH IXHO SRYHUW\ IURP 6FRWODQG¶V
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communities and ensure that we reach the most vulnerable in society and those least 
DEOHWRDIIRUGWRDGHTXDWHO\KHDWWKHLUKRPH7KDW¶VZK\ZHSODQWRLQWURGXFHD:DUP
Homes Bill to set a new statutory target for fuel poverty. We will consult on the new 
powers for the Scottish Parliament for the future delivery of the Energy Company 
Obligation and Warm Homes Discount, to ensure they are used most effectively to 
deliver on our dual objectives on fuHOSRYHUW\DQGFOLPDWHFKDQJH´ 
